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nOrth aMerica & the caribbean
the situatiOn Of wOMen anD girls 
in haiti exeMplifies the Difficulties 
Of pOst-natural Disaster 
prOtectiOn Of huMan rights
Almost two years after a catastrophic 
earthquake devastated Haiti, killing more 
than 220,000 people and leaving more than 
a million people displaced, over 600,000 
people still remain in makeshift tent 
cities, displaced within their own country. 
Disasters such as this leave a population 
vulnerable to disease and diminished per-
sonal security due to lack of infrastructure, 
rule of law, and effective public works. 
While deprivation of human rights may 
unfortunately be inevitable in extreme 
natural disasters, prevention of human 
rights abuses post-disaster is essential to 
protecting especially vulnerable groups. 
In Haiti, it was the existing inadequate 
human rights protections for women and 
girls that aggravated their vulnerability 
to increased sexual assault, gender based 
violence, and sex in exchange for basic 
needs post-earthquake. The grim situation 
faced by women and girls in Haiti indicates 
that where human rights protections are not 
sufficient, natural disasters only intensify 
existing abuses.
Before the earthquake, Haiti’s protec-
tion of women and girls was troubling. 
The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights reported, “forms of discrimination 
against women have been a fixture in the 
history of Haiti, both in times of peace and 
in times of unrest and violence.” Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) reports that according 
to the UN, between 2004 and 2006 up to 
50 percent of girls living in conflict zones 
in Port-au-Prince were victims of wide-
spread or systematic rape, sexual violence, 
or ‘gang’ rape. A survey of the area found 
that an estimated 35,000 women and girls 
were sexually assaulted between February 
2004 and December 2006.
“Experience has also shown that pre-
existing vulnerabilities and patterns of 
discrimination usually become exacerbated 
in situations of natural disaster,” states 
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s 
(IASC) Operational Guidelines on the 
Protection of Persons in Situations of 
Natural Disasters. Though there is not yet 
data available on the number of sexual 
assaults post-earthquake, HRW predicts 
the numbers have increased due to new 
vulnerabilities. Other human rights orga-
nizations have found potential correla-
tions between levels of hunger, survival 
or transactional sex, and an increased risk 
for gender-based violence. The recovery 
efforts are failing to protect and provide 
for women who are made more vulnerable 
by life in the tent camps.
Despite the earthquake, Haiti’s human 
rights obligations remain the same. Haiti 
is a party to several international human 
rights treaties that create binding obliga-
tions on the government to improve wom-
en’s health, including maternal and repro-
ductive health, such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
American Convention on Human Rights, 
and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment and Eradication 
of Violence Against Women. Moreover, 
the ratification of these international 
instruments demonstrates the State’s ack-
nowledgement of its responsibility to exer-
cise due diligence and undertake state 
actions to effectively address forms of dis-
crimination and violence against women.
Where the Government made pre-earth-
quake efforts to meet these obligations, 
it provided women some post-earthquake 
protection. The Ministry of Women created 
a five-year plan to improve the lives of 
women and girls throughout Haiti. The 
Ministry partnered with women’s NGOs, 
and UN Agencies to create the Concernation 
Nationale Contre Les Violence Faites Aux 
Femmes (Concertation Nationale). While 
the earthquake greatly affected these 
efforts, the Concertation Nationale cre-
ated some effective plans and legislation 
that aim to improve conditions for women. 
The Concertation Nationale helped to pass 
the 2005 decree making rape a crime and 
establishing a policy that all victims of 
sexual aggression can receive medical 
certification of sexual violence in order 
to ensure that evidence is present for the 
prosecution of perpetrators. The organi-
zation continues to push for the passage 
of anti-violence legislation that penalizes 
assailants, as well as public safety officials 
who do not enforce the law.
Despite the advancements, Haiti’s 
preventative and responsive efforts are 
falling short and the government is not 
fulfilling its obligations. The 2011 revi-
sion of the IASC Operational Guidelines 
provides that, “often, negative impacts on 
the human rights concerns after a natu-
ral disaster do not arise from purposeful 
policies but are the result of inadequate 
planning and disaster preparedness, inap-
propriate policies and measures to respond 
to the disasters, or simple neglect.” While 
the political and economic realities facing 
Haiti may render the government unable 
to protect human rights as it should, it is 
an important lesson that protecting human 
rights before a disaster is the best remedy 
to ensure them after one.
new natiOnal Defense authOrizatiOn 
act authOrizes inDefinite DetentiOn 
Of u.s. citizens
On October 26, 2001 President Bush 
enacted the Patriot Act authorizing indefi-
nite detention of non-U.S. citizens, allowing 
suspected terrorists to be detained without 
trial until the War on Terrorism ended. On 
January 11, 2002, the first group of twenty 
detainees arrived at Guantanamo Bay’s 
Camp X-Ray, where they were housed 
in open-air cages with concrete floors. 
Later that month, President Bush declared 
detainees’ status as unlawful enemy com-
batants, which disqualified them from 
prisoner-of-war protection under Article 
Five of the Geneva conventions (though 
protections are still afforded under Article 
Three). Human rights advocates argue that 
this system of indefinite detention cir-
cumvents the rule of law, and fails to 
prosecute terrorist suspects efficaciously, 
while wrongfully detaining hundreds. Yet 
on the eve of the ten-year anniversary of 
the first detainees arriving at Guantanamo 
Bay, President Obama signed the indefi-
nite detention of alleged terrorists into law, 
despite his previously voiced reservations.
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On December 31, 2011, President 
Obama signed the National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA), or H.R. 1540, 
for the 2012 fiscal year. Congress passes 
this act annually to monitor the budget for 
the Department of Defense, but this year 
the bill included highly controversial new 
provisions that allow indefinite military 
detention of U.S. citizen terrorist suspects, 
and requires the detention of suspected 
foreign enemies. The provisions also apply 
to any person who supports or aids “bel-
ligerent” acts against the United States, 
whether the person is apprehended abroad 
or on domestic soil.
U.S. citizens may now be joining the 
171 detainees who remain at Guantánamo 
Bay, most of whom have never been 
charged with a crime and do not know 
when they will face trial, if at all. Many 
of the detainees were subjected to forced 
disappearances in secret CIA custody prior 
to being brought to Guantánamo, as well 
as to torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment; held incommuni-
cado in solitary confinement for extended 
periods. Exactly what “interrogation tech-
niques” have been used and what condi-
tions the detainees were subjected to in 
CIA custody remains classified.
The Obama administration maintains 
that the law is merely a codification of 
existing standards and that U.S. citizens 
are exempt. While U.S. citizens are in fact 
exempted from the mandatory detention 
requirement of section 1032 of the new 
law, section 1031 offers no exemption for 
American citizens from the discretionary 
authorization of the U.S. Government to 
indefinitely detain them without charge 
or trial. Though supporters and critics dis-
agree on whether the new law is a positive 
step, they agree that it will mean much 
more than maintaining the status quo. 
Instead, the law enshrines military authority 
to detain and imprison civilians anywhere 
in the world, without formal charges or 
trial. The power to detain is so broad that 
U.S. citizens may now be taken by the 
military from any “battlefield.” In sup-
port of the bill, Senator Lindsey Graham 
explained that it will “basically say in law 
for the first time that the homeland is part 
of the battlefield” and that people can be 
imprisoned without charge or trial whether 
American citizens or not. Senator Graham 
elaborated that if a U.S. citizen is “thinking 
about helping al-Qaeda,” then they are an 
“enemy combatant” and are not entitled to 
legal representation.
For the past ten years, the indefinite 
detention system created by the Patriot 
Act has created a tenuous human rights 
situation for foreign nationals. The NDAA 
now extends the danger of human rights 
violations to U.S. citizens, and in the pro-
cess violates their constitutional rights. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution grants citizens liberty 
from unreasonable seizures of their person, 
while the Fifth Amendment guarantees 
that one cannot be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law. 
The Sixth amendment provides every U.S. 
citizen the right to a fair trial in front of a 
jury with the assistance of counsel. The 
NDAA provisions openly violate these 
constitutional rights and perpetuate the 
use of the facilities at Guantanamo Bay, 
now open to the U.S. citizens they pur-
ported to protect. President Obama issued 
a statement saying “I want to clarify that 
my Administration will not authorize the 
indefinite military detention without trial 
of American citizens . . . doing so would 
break with our most important traditions 
and values as a Nation.” Unfortunately, a 
presidential statement alone is not binding 
on future administrations’ interpretation 
of the NDAA. What will be left when 
the Obama Administration is gone is a 
law that authorizes human rights abuses 
and constitutional violations in the country 
and worldwide.
Anna Naimark, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers North America for the 
Human Rights Brief.
latin aMerica 
shutting DOwn clinics that 
‘cure hOMOsexuality’ in ecuaDOr
In January 2012, three Ecuadorian 
non-governmental organizations posted 
a petition on Change.org, asking the 
Ecuadorian Ministry of Health to close 
“ex-gay” clinics. The petition received 
over 100,000 signatures, sending a strong 
message to the Ecuadorian government 
from the international community. Until 
January, lesbians in Ecuador were being 
tortured and sexually abused in approxi-
mately two hundred clinics that claimed 
they could “cure” people of their homosex-
uality. The clinics generally masqueraded 
as drug rehabilitation centers throughout 
the country.
Despite the aims of these clinics, lesbian, 
gay, bi-sexual, transgender, and inter-sex 
(LGBTI) individuals in Ecuador actually 
enjoy more profound de jure recognition 
of their rights than do their counterparts 
in other countries in Latin America. For 
example, Ecuador was the first country in 
the Americas, and the third in the world, to 
include sexual orientation as a protected 
category in its Constitution in 1998. In 
1997, the country’s Constitutional Tribunal 
overturned section one of Article 516 of 
the Penal Code, which criminalized sexual 
activities between persons of the same 
sex. Article 68 of the 2008 Constitution 
formally recognized same-sex civil unions 
under the law, and Article 11 reiterated 
the freedom of all peoples from discrim-
ination. Article 66 also guaranteed all 
Ecuadorians the rights to physical, moral, 
and sexual integrity of person, as well as 
freedom of expression of sexual orienta-
tion. Finally, Article 212 of the Penal Code 
criminalizing hate speech, sanctions those 
who incite hate against any other person 
for reason of their sex, sexual orienta-
tion, or sexual identification, among other 
characteristics.
However, the de facto situation of 
LGBTI rights and protections against 
discrimination and even violence is com-
pletely contradictory to the law. These 
“intense rehabilitation” clinics employed 
methods prohibited under the United 
Nations Convention against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment and the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture. Ecuador is a state-party to 
both of these conventions, and to the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
and the Inter-American Convention on the 
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication 
of Violence against Women — conventions 
whose principles are violated by abuses 
which were taking place at these clinics.
Twenty-four year-old Paola Ziritti came 
forward after being held against her will 
in a clinic for two years, and reported that 
the clinic staff would routinely sexually 
and physically assault her. She spent sev-
eral months handcuffed and was regularly 
doused with urine and water. Other women 
have reported being raped or threatened 
with rape, handcuffed, deprived of food 
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and water, and forced to dress like pros-
titutes, according to Tatiana Velasquez, a 
representative of Taller de Comunicación 
Mujer, one of the organizations that peti-
tioned the Ministry of Health to shut 
down the clinics. Taller de Comunicación 
Mujer, along with Fundación Causana 
and Artikulación Esporádika, have worked 
with clinic victims since at least 2005. 
However, information about the situation 
of the LGBTI community in Ecuador is 
difficult to find, as homosexuality is still 
taboo in Ecuadorian society and is rarely 
discussed. Despite efforts by the LGBTI 
community to assert itself, as evidenced 
most recently by the July 2011 pride 
parades in Quito and Guayaquil, the coun-
try’s two largest cities, the relative strength 
of the Catholic Church, as well as the 
machismo which permeates the culture, 
may be barriers to successfully lobbying 
for the closure of these clinics. During the 
2008 constitutional referendum, conserva-
tive Catholic clergy and evangelical church 
leaders allied themselves with the “No” 
vote in protest over the legalization of 
same-sex civil unions. Furthermore, apart 
from the religious belief that homosexual-
ity is a moral wrong, many people believe 
that homosexuality is also a curable dis-
ease, as evidenced by the prevalence of 
these torture clinics.
Regardless of outside influences and 
prevailing societal beliefs about homo-
sexuality in Ecuador, the Ecuadorian 
Government has a legal obligation to 
continue to close these clinics. Whether 
Ecuadorian or international bodies take 
action, the practices these clinics employed 
are illegal and a violation of the rights of 
the women who were trapped in them.
cOlOMbia taKes a step tOwarD 
Justice with its victiMs law
Colombia is continuing its work toward 
lasting peace by addressing the needs 
of the victims of the country’s decades-
long armed conflict. On June 10, 2011, 
President Juan Manuel Santos signed 
the Victims and Land Restitution Law 
(Victims Law), which complies with the 
United Nations’ Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and 
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law 
and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles) of 
2005. The goal of the Victims Law is to 
require the return of land appropriated 
by armed groups to its rightful inhabit-
ants, and to financially compensate the 3.7 
million internally-displaced persons (IDPs) 
and other victims of violence since 1985. 
Santos’ government chose 1985 as the ear-
liest date to which people could cite claims 
because of that year’s symbolic importance 
in the country’s history — on November 6, 
1985, members of the now-defunct M-19 
guerilla group stormed the Palace of Justice 
in Bogotá. The event ended in the death of 
eleven of the twenty-five Supreme Court 
Justices, all thirty-five participating M-19 
members, and nearly fifty army soldiers.
The Victims Law was generally 
greeted with support and enthusiasm by 
the Colombian and international com-
munities, as evidenced by UN Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon’s presence at the 
signing ceremony. In accordance with the 
Basic Principles, the Victims Law strictly 
defines victims as unarmed civilians who 
suffered violations of international human 
rights and humanitarian law during the 
armed conflict. If the victim is deceased, 
immediate family members may make a 
claim on behalf of the victim. No armed 
combatants can apply to the victims’ fund 
for compensation, except for former child 
soldiers. The law also outlines the general 
principles that will guide the restitution 
process, including dignity, equality, good 
faith, and due process. Article 28 of the 
law details a list of victims’ rights during 
the restitution process, including, among 
others, the right to truth and justice, family 
reunification, and lives free of violence. 
The Victims Law also complies with the 
Basic Principles by describing the process 
victims must go through in order to make 
their restitution claims, and the social 
services available to victims during and 
after this process. The Basic Principles 
provide for access to justice and repara-
tions for harm suffered. In recognition of 
the fact that giving detailed accounts of 
the violence victims experienced would be 
emotionally taxing, the Colombian govern-
ment will provide counseling services for 
those who file restitution claims. Special 
consideration is given to IDPs and vulner-
able populations like the indigenous and 
Afro-Colombians, as well as human rights 
defenders and union organizers. Finally, 
the law includes specific measures for land 
resettlement, which are presented in more 
detail in the corresponding regulations.
President Santos signed these regula-
tions on December 20, 2011. They were 
drafted in response to questions about 
how the reparations provisions would 
actually be enforced, and they establish 
more detailed assistance measures for the 
victims. The three main components of 
the regulations are restitution payments to 
victims (up to US $11,900 each, over 
the next ten years), administrative proce-
dures to enroll in the victims’ fund, and 
safeguards for vulnerable populations to 
prevent gross human rights violations in 
the future. The amount of each restitution 
payment will be determined partly by the 
severity of the violence suffered by the 
victim during the civil war, but also by 
the types of positive steps the victim or 
the victim’s family has taken since then to 
rebuild his or her life. For example, higher 
payments will be given to those who have 
already invested in their education or that 
of their children, or who promise to do so 
in the future. This provision is in keeping 
with the Basic Principles as well.
A special office has been created 
to assist IDPs in establishing their land 
claims. Civil society organizations in 
Colombia have reported that citizens were 
not only forced to flee because of the 
violence, but were also forcibly evicted 
from their land in many cases. This land 
was then cultivated to finance the armed 
conflict. President Santos hopes to return 
over five million acres of land to displaced 
persons in the next few years. Concerns 
remain, however, about the possibility of 
renewed violence against victims returning 
to their land — since Santos took office 
in August 2010, over twenty leaders of 
farmers attempting to reclaim stolen land 
have been murdered and only six people 
have been arrested in these killings to 
date. Despite explicit warnings by the 
Colombian government that such violent 
acts will no longer be tolerated, no changes 
have been made to the penal code and the 
Victims Law does not directly address this 
new violence. Therefore, only time will tell 
if the Victims Law can truly provide the 
justice it promises.
Christina Fetterhoff, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers Latin America for 
the Human Rights Brief.
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MiDDle east anD nOrth africa
page nOt fOunD: the tunisian 
internet agency’s appeal tO 
eliMinate censOrship
On August 15, 2011, a Tunisian appellate 
court upheld a May 2011 order requiring 
the Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI) to censor 
Internet access for all Tunisians. The ATI 
intends to appeal the decision to the Tunisian 
Court of Cassation, the country’s highest 
court. Under new leadership after the 
January 2011 revolution, the ATI opened 
Tunisia up to the Internet fully for the 
first time in the country’s history. The 
ATI is using the resources at its disposal 
to advocate for freedom of expression via 
the Internet and against Internet censor-
ship. The Agency encountered resistance 
on two fronts: from the Tunisian courts, 
which ordered the ATI to block all porno-
graphic material, and from the Tunisian 
military, which ordered the agency to cen-
sor certain politically objectionable sites 
and Facebook pages. If the ATI loses its 
pending appeal, the agency will, pursuant 
to judicial order, block a classified list of 
websites deemed morally objectionable 
that the government can update at will. 
The creation and enforcement of such a 
censorship list would violate Article 19 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). Judicial censor-
ship of the Internet in Tunisia combined 
with the political agenda advanced by the 
military would together represent a de 
facto state of censorship not much differ-
ent from the one present under the regime 
of ousted former President Ben Ali.
Under the Ben Ali regime, the ATI 
blocked culturally and politically objec-
tionable content using censorship software 
installed at the Internet’s point-of-entry 
into the country. The newly elected legis-
lature is facing pressure from progressive 
groups in the country to repeal old statutes 
that remain in force, including laws that 
proscribe jail time for nonviolent speech 
and structural modifications that effec-
tively give the executive branch total con-
trol over the nomination, promotion and 
discipline of judges.
Article 19 of the ICCPR, to which 
Tunisia is a party, provides that “Everyone 
shall have the right to freedom of expres-
sion; this right shall include freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the 
form of art, or through any other media of 
his choice.” (emphasis added). According 
to General Comment 34, which describes 
the UN Human Rights Committee’s inter-
pretation of Article 19, parties to the 
ICCPR must protect Internet-based forums 
and “take all necessary steps to foster the 
independence of these new media and to 
ensure access of individuals thereto.”
The planned censorship list put forth 
by the Tunisian court contravenes both the 
letter of the treaty and its interpretation 
by the Committee. General Comment 34 
reads Article 19 to include all information 
including “political discourse, commen-
tary on one’s own or public affairs,” even 
if it is “deeply offensive.” The military 
is a legitimate arm of the government 
and often a political force itself, and the 
order to censor anti-military statements 
on Facebook seems to fall squarely within 
the definition of permissible political 
discourse under Article 19. Additionally, 
the censorship of pornographic materials 
may contravene the prohibition against 
censoring even “deeply offensive” material, 
although in practice more conservative inter-
pretations may find certain pornography 
to be a form of gender discrimination and 
therefore subject to restriction to prevent 
public morals. Even under such a reading, 
the General Comment makes clear that 
removing all individual choice and giving the 
government total control over the regulation 
of pornography would constitute “unfettered 
discretion” in violation of Article 19.
The classified list of censored materials 
proposed under the court order is a trou-
bling and immeasurable step backwards 
for the free society that the new govern-
ment endeavors to build. Tunisia experi-
enced its first free election on October 
23, 2011, and the inability for its citizens 
to discuss future government formations 
and political issues using the Internet as 
a forum runs counter to both the goal of 
building a new democratically engaged 
nation and Tunisia’s treaty obligations 
under the ICCPR not to confer “unfet-
tered discretion” to limit freedoms using 
national laws.
saleh’s aMnesty: prOviDing peace 
Or preventing reMeDy?
On January 21, 2012, the Yemeni par-
liament passed a law granting President 
Ali Saleh immunity for all “politically 
motivated” crimes against the people of 
Yemen. This statement of immunity formed 
the substantive part of a Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) brokered deal between 
Saleh and the new Yemeni parliament. 
The International Covenant for Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) requires signatory 
states to ensure that victims of violations of 
the ICCPR, such as those allegedly com-
mitted by Saleh during the recent Yemeni 
revolutions, have access to an effective 
remedy. The parliament’s decision to neu-
tralize Yemeni citizens’ ability to prosecute 
President Saleh in exchange for his voluntary 
abdication of power represents a violation of 
Yemen’s obligations to provide an effective 
remedy for violations of the ICCPR.
As part of the January agreement, Saleh 
ended his career as President and trans-
ferred power to Vice President Abd-Rabbu 
Hadi. Hadi went on to run unopposed in 
the February 2012 election, winning 99% 
of a vote in which barely 64% of the citi-
zenry participated. The new immunity law 
protects Saleh and his aides from prosecu-
tion for their role in widespread violence 
against civilians peacefully protesting the 
government since February 2011, resulting 
in the death of around 2,000 civilians and 
military defectors. Protesters calling for 
constitutional and governmental reform 
suffered from armed attacks, arbitrary 
arrests, torture, and forced disappearances. 
The immunity also extends to public pros-
ecution of crimes committed by Saleh and 
his aides over the course of his 33-year 
rule, including the government’s contro-
versial use of artillery against the Huthis 
in Northern Yemen during the period of 
unrest Yemen experienced between 2004 
and 2010. While lauded as an efficient 
way to put a prompt end to the bloodshed, 
the immunity deal garnered widespread 
Western and GCC support due to concerns 
that al-Qaeda, which enjoys a strong pres-
ence in Yemen, might be strengthened by 
continued unrest.
The new immunity law violates Yemen’s 
international legal responsibilities under 
the ICCPR, to which Yemen is a party. 
Article 2 of the ICCPR states that “[e]ach 
State Party undertakes . . . to ensure that 
any person whose rights or freedoms as 
herein recognized are violated shall have 
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that 
the violation has been committed by per-
sons acting in an official capacity.” Thus, 
the ICCPR guarantees an effective remedy 
to any citizen whose rights have been 
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violated, regardless of whether the per-
petrator was acting in his official capac-
ity. Despite the political considerations 
in Yemen, General Comment 31 of the 
Human Rights Committee, which informs 
analysis of states’ obligations under Article 
2, notes that “[t]he requirement under 
article 2, paragraph 2, to take steps to give 
effect to the Covenant rights is unqualified 
and of immediate effect. A failure to com-
ply with this obligation cannot be justified 
by reference to political, social, cultural or 
economic considerations within the State.”
Amnesty can be a powerful conflict 
resolution tool, but guidelines published by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR) prohibit broad, 
blanket grants of amnesty that infringe on 
essential human rights by preventing pros-
ecution of those who “may be responsible” 
for crimes against humanity. The reintegra-
tion of combatants back into society, both 
judicially and socially, is a common obsta-
cle to national repair following intrastate 
conflict, and immunity from prosecution is 
a customary way to begin reconciliation as 
discussed by the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC). This comes with 
the explicit exception that such amnesty 
should not be used to allow those with 
command authority and suspected of war 
crimes to evade punishment.
The new immunity law signed by 
President Saleh contravenes both the let-
ter and spirit of the ICCPR, and a fun-
damental misuse of amnesty as a remedy 
for any government-sponsored prosecution 
for crimes committed against the people 
of Yemen. Without making a judgment 
as to President Saleh’s guilt or innocence 
by preventing the requisite investigation, 
the Yemeni parliament has acted inconsis-
tently with international law. The General 
Comment notes that failure to investigate 
violations of the aforementioned rights, 
implicitly folded into the government’s 
blanket grant of criminal immunity, may 
constitute a separate breach of the ICCPR.
Internal politics within Yemen make it 
unclear as to whether conventional politi-
cal channels of overturning a policy like 
this one would even be possible. The 
Supreme Court is effectively controlled 
by the Executive branch, and one chamber 
of the bicameral legislature — the Sura 
Council — is entirely appointed by the 
President. The President’s majority party 
controls 238 of the 301 seats in the other 
legislative chamber. Given the present state 
of internal Yemeni politics making domes-
tic change unlikely, a diametric shift at the 
highest level of parliament as the issuing 
body is necessary to ensure compliance 
with Yemen’s international obligations. If 
legislation like this immunity law is used to 
parlay citizens’ internationally guaranteed 
right to redress in exchange for political 
stability, the weight of international legal 
commitments would be insignificant in the 
minds of policymakers and national enti-
ties responsible for enforcement.
Kyle Bates, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers the Middle East and North 
Africa for the Human Rights Brief.
sub-saharan africa
labOr abuses in zaMbia’s 
cOpperbelt
Zambia, known for its mineral wealth and 
currently Africa’s largest copper producer, 
has attracted significant Chinese invest-
ment since 1990. While these investments 
have created jobs and increased copper 
production, human rights groups decry 
the copper mines’ poor labor conditions 
that have existed since these investments 
began. A recent Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) report examines the labor practices 
of Chinese state-owned copper mines, and 
calls on the Zambian and Chinese govern-
ments to take measures to enforce labor 
laws and conform to international labor 
standards. Advocacy organizations like 
HRW hope that shedding light on these 
violations will ensure that further eco-
nomic development of Zambia does not 
jeopardize the safety of its workers.
Observed labor violations in the 
Chinese-owned mines include low wages, 
long hours, a lack of safety standards, 
and undercutting of mining unions. While 
dangers are inherent to copper mining, 
Zambian government representatives admit 
that safety conditions in Chinese-owned 
copper mines are very poor. For example, 
in 2005, mine explosions killed forty-six 
Zambian workers, many of whom were 
initially unidentified because the mine 
operators did not keep employee records. 
Contrary to copper mining and processing 
standards throughout Zambia, the Chinese-
owned mines often require twelve-hour 
shifts instead of the eight-hour shifts 
outlined in Zambian mining standards. 
The HRW report details safety and health 
hazards resulting from toxins and dust 
inhalation, as well as the lack of proper 
attire and equipment to prevent these haz-
ards. Notably, HRW points out that the poor 
safety standards in Zambia’s Chinese-run 
mines resemble the labor abuses occurring 
in mines in China.
Zambia’s Mines Safety Department is 
responsible for enforcing the country’s 
mining regulations. However, human 
rights groups report that the department 
is ineffective, failing to enforce both 
domestic and international labor law in 
the Chinese-owned copper mines. While 
regulation of all Zambian mines is sub-
par, human rights group emphasize that 
the Chinese-owned mines are some of 
the worst in the country. International 
Labor Organization Convention No. 176 
concerning Safety and Health in Mines 
sets out basic mine safety standards that 
states and employers must follow. Not 
only do Chinese employers fail to comply 
with these standards, but they also tend to 
discriminate against employees for affili-
ation with non-Chinese labor unions even 
though freedom of association is pro-
tected under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. Domestically, mine safety 
and freedom of association are outlined 
within the Zambian Industrial and Labour 
Relations Act 269 and the Minimum Wages 
and Conditions of Employment Act 267.
HRW has called on the Chinese 
government to convene the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation to establish 
mechanisms addressing labor conditions 
and compliance with international human 
rights standards in foreign investments. 
HRW also recommends that the Zambian 
government improve the functionality of 
the Mines Safety Department, and also 
investigate and prosecute mining company 
officials who intimidate miners into work-
ing in hazardous areas.
In response to the HRW report, the 
Chinese Non-Ferrous Metals Mining 
Corporation (CNM), which operates four 
copper mines in Zambia, said that “lan-
guage and cultural differences” could have 
resulted in “misunderstandings.” Since the 
report’s release, however, CNM has prom-
ised to conduct a general investigation, and 
also to rectify existing malpractices. Yet 
human rights groups continue to emphasize 
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the need for involvement of the Zambian 
government if labor conditions and standards 
are to improve.
Human rights abuses associated with 
Chinese involvement in Africa are not 
limited to Zambia. Recently, China has 
sold arms to the Sudanese government, 
some of which have been used to remove 
indigenous southerners from their lands 
to provide for Chinese development of 
oil fields. Additionally, the government 
of Zimbabwe has become heavily reliant 
on Chinese lending and investment in 
exchange for natural resources; human 
rights advocates note with frustration 
the detrimental social impact of growing 
Chinese alliance with Zimbabwe, allowing 
Zimbabwe to continue practices contrary 
to international norms and pressure.
The consequences of China’s increased 
involvement in Africa remain the subject of 
much debate among human rights groups. 
While China’s willingness to build roads 
in Gabon, develop mines in Zambia, and 
buy oil in Sudan has allowed for increased 
economic development, human rights 
advocates continue to address the lack 
of respect for human rights. As Zambia’s 
mining industry grows, advocates will 
continue to make the case that sacrificing 
domestic and international labor standards, 
along with other human rights, is too big a 
price to pay to attract foreign investment.
abuse Of sOMali refugees in Kenya 
anD ethiOpia
Since 2010, escalating conflict in south-
ern Somalia between forces allied with the 
Somali Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) and the Islamist armed group 
al-Shabaab has resulted in thousands of 
civilian casualties and numerous human 
rights abuses against the refugee popula-
tion. Human rights groups continue to 
encourage the TFG, the United Nations 
(UN), the African Union (AU), the 
Kenyan and Ethiopian Governments, and 
the African Union Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM) to take steps to ensure that 
all parties are trained on international 
humanitarian law standards and how to 
respond to the increasingly frequent abuses 
committed against refugees.
The current conflict between the TFG 
and Al-Shabaab began in 2006 when the 
TFG, Ethiopian troops, and other military 
allies defeated the Islamist Courts Union 
(ICU), which was a rival administration to 
the TFG based on Sharia law. Al-Shabaab 
formed shortly after this defeat as a TFG 
off-shoot and has been causing havoc ever 
since. Recently, the number of uprooted 
and displaced Somalis has increased 
dramatically due to regional instability, 
and extreme drought and famine. Somali 
civilians continue to flee drought and con-
flict-affected areas to seek assistance across 
the border, but have faced repeated and 
unlawful deportation back to their war-torn 
country despite obligations under the 1951 
Refugee Convention to allow safe haven to 
asylum seekers escaping violence.
The severe drought, combined with 
the armed conflict, have led the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees to deem the 
situation in Somalia “the worst humanitarian 
crisis in the world today.” In 2010, the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
reported that nearly 1.46 million civilians 
had been displaced, including 614,000 forced 
to flee to neighboring countries. Since this 
crisis declaration, human rights groups have 
been calling for international relief efforts. 
Additionally, these groups have criticized 
Kenyan and Ethiopian forces for violating 
international humanitarian law standards by 
returning refugees to conflict areas.
Human rights groups have reported 
numerous other human rights violations 
perpetrated against Somali refugees in 
addition to forced return, including arrest, 
deportation, and abuses by military forces 
and police. For example, in violation of 
Kenya’s Refugee Act of 2006, Kenyan 
police regularly arrest without cause 
and extort money from Somali refugees. 
Furthermore, overcrowding and a con-
tinued influx of asylum seekers have led 
to poor living conditions in the refugee 
camps. The Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya 
is currently the largest refugee camp in the 
world, sheltering around 450,000 refugees 
though it was built to hold only 30,000. 
As a result of camp congestion, vulnerable 
groups such as women and unaccompa-
nied children experience little protection. 
Human rights groups have also received 
reports of Kenyan police raping Somali 
refugees and not being held accountable 
even when the information comes to light.
Similar to the refugee situation in 
Kenya, Somali refugees in Ethiopia face 
instability and abuse. When Somali women 
and girls travel to and arrive at refugee 
camps in Dolo Ado, Ethiopia, they expe-
rience an increased risk of gender-based 
violence, including rape, violence, and 
forced marriage. A lack of permanent 
security measures and preventive efforts 
such as adequate lighting at transit cen-
ters has impeded efforts to alleviate these 
human rights violations.
In light of these crises, human rights 
advocates emphasize the importance of 
TFG’s collaboration with the interna-
tional community, as outlined in the 2011 
Kampala Accord, to assist the transitional 
government in holding accountable those 
responsible for humanitarian law viola-
tions. International humanitarian law, also 
known as the law of war, is defined in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which 
seek to limit the effects of armed conflict 
on civilians and to restrict the methods 
of warfare. These norms are intended to 
protect wounded members of the armed 
forces, prisoners of war, and refugees in 
conflict areas.
One critical component of international 
humanitarian law is the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, which requires conflicting 
parties to follow the principles of non-
discrimination and non-penalization of 
civilian conflict victims. The Convention 
also contains non-refoulement provisions 
that prohibit the forced return of refugees 
facing persecution or violence in their 
countries of origin, which Ethiopia and 
Kenya have violated by refusing safe haven 
to Somali refugees.
As abuses against Somali refugees 
are increasingly exposed, the interna-
tional community continues to call on the 
Somali, Kenyan, and Ethiopian govern-
ments to respect humanitarian law. Human 
rights activists insist that hosts of Somali 
refugees end their unlawful return and 
alleviate overcrowding of refugee camps. 
Without timely investigation and pros-
ecution of international humanitarian law 
violations being perpetrated within and 
outside Somalia, however, measures to 
improve refugee conditions will prove 
insufficient to address the humanitarian 
crisis confronting the Somali people.
Saralyn Salisbury, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers Sub-Saharan Africa 
for the Human Rights Brief.
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eurOpe
the case Of n.Ç.: a turKish 
chilD’s presuMeD cOnsent tO 
prOstitutiOn
In many countries, when a thirteen-
year-old girl is sold as a child prostitute, 
courts presume the girl has been raped. 
The Supreme Court of Appeals in Turkey 
recently found otherwise. Two women, who 
purported to be thirteen-year-old N.Ç.’s 
employers at a local factory in the province 
of Mardin, sold her as a child prostitute to 
over twenty-six men for a period of seven 
months. Both women have been sentenced 
to nine years in prison, but the twenty-six 
men, including teachers, civil servants, 
and village elders, have received reduced 
sentences ranging from one to six years. 
The men benefited from a legal techni-
cality, namely the old Turkish penal code 
that was in effect at the time of the rapes 
included a provision allowing reduced 
sentences in cases where the minor 
consented to the sexual activity. The lowest 
court applied the old code, ruled that the 
girl consented to the intercourse, and sen-
tenced each of the men to a minimum of 
five years in prison for statutory rape. The 
court also agreed to lower the sentences 
of some defendants by between two and 
ten months based on good behavior during 
the trial. Upon appeal, the Supreme Court 
upheld the lower court’s ruling, and an 
official of the Court defended its applica-
tion of the old code as an “undebatable rule 
of law.” The reduced sentences for these 
perpetrators are alarmingly indicative of 
the state of children’s rights in Turkey.
The new code leaves no room for con-
sideration of consent by a minor to sexual 
intercourse (the age for sexual consent in 
Turkey is fifteen). As such, the new law 
seems to be a legal victory for children’s 
rights. However, the alarming fact of N.Ç.’s 
case is not that the courts applied the old 
penal code. Courts are often precluded 
from retroactively applying new laws. The 
alarming fact of N.Ç.’s case is that all of 
the judges on Turkey’s Supreme Court 
ruled that N.Ç. consented to sexual inter-
course with at least twenty-six men. In 
other words, the Supreme Court ruled that 
a thirteen-year-old girl had the capacity 
to consent to child prostitution. If a child 
can legally consent to prostitution, then 
child prostitution in itself is not a violation 
of that child’s human rights unless it is 
against the child’s will. If a court is willing 
to rule that a thirteen-year-old girl such as 
N.Ç. engaged in the intercourse willingly, 
then what child-victim of sexual violence 
stands a chance of obtaining justice in 
Turkey? Because the Supreme Court is 
Turkey’s highest court, N.Ç.’s only alterna-
tive for recourse is through an international 
court of human rights.
International human rights law does 
not permit the assumption of consent by 
a minor to prostitution. Article 34 of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
requires that all State Parties undertake to 
protect children from all forms of sexual 
exploitation and abuse by taking appro-
priate national, bilateral, and multilateral 
measures to prevent child prostitution. 
Article 3 of the Optional Protocol to 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child requires that all participating State 
Parties make sexual exploitation of a child 
a criminal offense, and take measures to 
establish the liability of legal persons for 
committing an offense of child prostitu-
tion. Neither document mentions or allows 
consent by a child to rape or prostitution. 
Turkey ratified both the Convention and 
the Optional Protocol in 1995 and 2002 
respectively.
The conventions imply that there is no 
basis in international human rights law for 
the assumption of consent by a minor to 
acts of sexual violence, and many people 
in Turkey seem to agree. Human rights 
activists protested the Supreme Court’s 
ruling outside the Palace of Justice in 
Istanbul on Friday, November 4, 2011. 
The Family and Social Policies Minister 
of Turkey, Fatma €ahin, called the sen-
tence “unacceptable and worrying;” the 
President of Turkey himself, Abdullah Gul, 
said the Supreme Court’s ruling made 
him “deeply uncomfortable;” and Umit 
Kocasakal, head of Istanbul’s bar asso-
ciation, said the Supreme Court’s decision 
was “bloodcurdling.” But Supreme Court 
officials simply stated that “this decision is 
not definite, it is also not possible for this 
decision to be changed by making noise.”
Regardless of the reason for the 
Supreme Court’s decision, N.Ç.’s case illu-
minates the reality that the achievement 
of human rights principles must come 
through the law, at the hands of those who 
administer it. Without the support of a 
society’s judicial authorities, victims of 
human rights violations have grim pros-
pects for justice and restitution.
electiOn frauD prOtests in russia
Briefly in January and February 2012, 
it appeared the Russian government had 
decidedly altered its public policy against 
opposition protests and public demonstra-
tions. The Russian government allowed 
two successful, peaceful demonstrations to 
occur on December 10 and December 24, 
2011, and a third, much later, on February 
26, 2012. Human rights organizations and 
activists looked hopeful and remarked on 
possible explanations for the policy shift. 
But the government’s arrest of nearly 550 
people at election fraud demonstrations on 
March 5, 2012 has refuted these hopes.
The Russian government has ratified 
several legal documents that protect the 
right of its citizens to protest publicly. 
Russian Constitution Article 31 states that 
Russian citizens “shall have the right to 
gather peacefully, without weapons, and 
to hold meetings, rallies, demonstrations, 
marches, and pickets.” In customary inter-
national law, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) Article 20 provides 
for freedom of peaceful assembly and asso-
ciation and Article 19 provides for freedom 
of opinion and expression. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) Article 21 requires states to rec-
ognize the right of peaceful assembly and 
provides that “no restrictions . . . be placed 
on the exercise of this right other than those 
imposed in conformity with the law and 
which are necessary in a democratic soci-
ety in the interests of national security or 
public safety, public order, the protection of 
public health or morals or the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others.” In prac-
tice, this provision enables governments to 
require protesters to obtain permits prior to 
holding public demonstrations.
Though not required specifically by 
its Constitution, the Russian government 
requires citizens to obtain a written permit 
from local authorities, such as the local 
Mayor’s office, before protesting publicly. 
Applicants must indicate the location and 
estimated number of participants, and may 
be subject to a nominal fine if their esti-
mates turn out inaccurately low. If Russian 
authorities meet resistance when attempting 
to disperse demonstrators, resisting pro-
testers may be detained for up to 15 days.
Prior to the March 5 arrests, some 
commentators theorized that the change 
in Russia’s response to public protests 
could conceivably be explained by the 
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permit requirement. Previous protests that 
ended in mass arrests either did not have 
a permit at all, or had displayed gross 
inconsistencies between the number of 
individuals estimated to participate and 
those who actually attended, with the lat-
ter exceeding the former by thousands in 
some cases. Conversely, both December 
demonstrations were sanctioned by the 
Russian authorities after demonstrators 
obtained the required permits, and were 
carried out peacefully, with no violence 
occurring between police and demonstra-
tors. The permit requirement theory may 
also explain the March 5 arrests, as many 
of those arrested had refused to leave their 
demonstration sites even after their protest 
permits had expired at 9 p.m.
While protestors’ failures to satisfy per-
mit requirements may explain the gov-
ernment’s varied responses to demonstra-
tions, other commentators theorized that 
December’s peaceful protests should be 
attributed to something less tangible — the 
political considerations required by the new 
and middle-class demographic participat-
ing in those protests. Vladislav Y. Surkov, a 
Kremlin official who previously protected 
Mr. Putin from potentially politically dan-
gerous street rallies, stated the protestors 
on December 10 represented “the best part 
of our society, or, more accurately, the most 
productive part.” Yevgeny S. Gontmakher, a 
government economic advisor, commented 
on the remarkability of the protestors’ 
demands for political rights rather than 
economic relief, stating this fact “is a sign 
that Russia is becoming a Western country, 
in its own way.”
Now following the March 5 arrests, 
another theory must be posited: perhaps 
the seeming, now probably temporary, 
policy shift had nothing to do with permit 
requirements or protest demographics. 
Perhaps instead it was simply and entirely 
political. In Russia, political protests are 
renowned for producing violence, but not 
change. Perhaps permitting the protests 
to occur peacefully was only Vladimir 
Putin’s bone to the people to appease them 
after allegedly rigged parliamentary elec-
tions in December but before his expected 
presidential election on March 4. If so, 
one might argue it was quite an effective 
distraction. No notable protests occurred 
between December 24 and February 26, 
and Human Rights Watch, which moni-
tored the protests, continued to write that 
the protests occurred peacefully.
Regardless, Vladimir Putin is Russia’s 
President yet again, and opposition protest-
ers are being arrested in droves. Perhaps the 
next election season will provide renewed 
hope for the respect of the people’s right 
to peaceful assembly — but then again, a 
cynic would say, that seems rather unlikely.
Rachael Curtis, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers Europe for the Human 
Rights Brief.
sOuth anD central asia
taJiKistan’s parental 
respOnsibility law: preventing 
extreMisM Or viOlating rights?
On August 6, 2011, Tajikistan’s presi-
dent, Emomali Rahmon, signed the 
Parental Responsibility Law into effect, 
banning children under the age of eighteen 
from attending religious services except 
funerals. On August 31, police began stop-
ping individuals under the age of eighteen 
from entering mosques to celebrate Eid 
al-Fitr. The law is exclusively enforced 
against Muslims, who make up 90% of 
Tajikistan’s population. According to 
Suhaili Hodirou, a spokesperson for the 
Tajik government’s Office of Human 
Rights, “Religious activity is only banned 
up to the age of 18 — beyond that they 
have full rights.” The Tajik government 
adopted the Parental Responsibility Law 
in conjunction with an amendment to the 
Criminal Code created to punish organizers 
of “extremist religious” teaching to create 
a safer environment for children who the 
government says are vulnerable to recruit-
ment by extremist groups. These provisions 
violate the freedom of worship provided in 
Article 18 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and, as 
a party to the ICCPR, Tajikistan is bound to 
protect the right to freedom of religion, the 
right to peaceful assembly, and the right to 
engage in cultural activities.
The new laws restricting religious 
freedom come during a movement to 
eliminate unsanctioned religious teaching, 
which the government suggests leads to 
violent extremism. The President intro-
duced the new laws after the Tajikistan 
Defense Minister released a report show-
ing increased juvenile violent crime 
rates in 2010. In August 2010, President 
Rahmon made an announcement to Tajik 
parents warning that their “children will 
become extremists and terrorists” if they 
did not bring the approximately 2,000 stu-
dents home from Islamic colleges abroad. 
During 2011, government authorities shut 
down mosques throughout Tajikistan’s cap-
ital, arrested individuals in their homes for 
teaching unapproved schools of Muslim 
thought, and forced religious groups to pay 
for heavy censoring of literature.
Article 8 of the Parental Responsibility 
Law states, “Parents are obliged…not to 
let children-teenagers participate in the 
activity of religious organizations.” The 
only children exempt from this law are 
those enrolled in state-sanctioned religious 
schools. The Tajik government’s laws vio-
late multiple articles in the ICCPR, most 
notably Article 18. Article 18 provides 
for freedom of “thought, conscience, and 
religion” and is one of the ICCPR’s seven 
non-derogable rights. Because the Article 
18 rights are non-derogable, Tajikistan 
cannot, except under very limited circum-
stances, infringe on these rights. Although 
the Parental Responsibility Law does not 
prevent individuals from self-identifying 
as Muslim or from practicing Islam as an 
adult, it does violate the Article 18 right 
for any individual to “manifest his religion 
or belief in worship, observance, practice, 
and teaching.” Article 18 also requires that 
countries “respect the liberty of parents…to 
ensure the religious and moral education of 
their children in conformity with their own 
convictions.” The Parental Responsibility 
Law prevents parents from exercising the 
right to educate their children in accordance 
with their religious beliefs.
Paragraph 3 of Article 18 allows excep-
tions to the freedom to worship when 
restriction is necessary to protect the public 
interest. However, General Comment 22 
specifies that these restrictions should be 
interpreted narrowly: limitations may never 
derogate from Article 18’s “fundamental 
character” but may restrain the freedom to 
manifest religious beliefs if the restrictions 
are necessary to protect other rights guaran-
teed in the ICCPR. Permissible limitations 
must meet the specific purpose for which 
the restriction is implemented, be directly 
related and proportionate to the need it is 
meant to fill, and may not be “applied in a 
discriminatory manner.”
If, as President Rahmon says, the 
Parental Responsibility Law is necessary 
to prevent religious extremism and ter-
rorism in Tajikistan, the restriction must 
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be directly related and proportionate to 
the possibility of individuals becoming 
terrorists through religious practice in 
Tajikistan. Because the Criminal Code 
does not specify the meaning of “extrem-
ist religious” teaching and the new law 
restricts most children from attending all 
religious activities, the statute is neither 
directly related nor proportionate. The 
Parental Responsibility Law is also being 
implemented in a discriminatory manner 
because, thus far, it has only been enforced 
against Muslims. The right to freedom 
of religion is non-derogable under the 
ICCPR, and the Parental Responsibility 
Law does not meet the Comment’s strin-
gent test to allow for limitation on the 
manifestation of religious practice.
exchanging reprODuctive Justice 
fOr a fOOD prOcessOr: incentivizeD 
sterilizatiOn in raJasthan, inDia
In the summer of 2011, India’s National 
Population Stabilization Fund (Fund) 
instituted a new scheme in Jhunjhunu, 
Rajasthan, a rural town west of New Delhi, 
offering incentives for area residents who 
agreed to undergo sterilization surgery. 
Government health officials created a 
sweepstakes program, entering those who 
agree to be sterilized into a drawing to 
win a TV, mini car, or food processor. 
This scheme represents one of a pattern of 
programs designed to help India meet its 
Millennium Development Goal to reduce 
its birth rate to two children per mother 
by 2015. While the program does perform 
some vasectomies, incentive programs 
in rural communities disproportionately 
affect women: according to the most recent 
National Family Health Survey, 37 percent 
of Indian women have been surgically 
sterilized, and one percent of men have 
had vasectomies. The use of incentivizing, 
and often coercive, practices by govern-
ment health officials compromise women’s 
health by encouraging women to undergo 
this dangerous procedure, often without 
informed consent, proper health care, or 
family planning information. By creating 
programs that decrease women’s access 
to quality health care and family plan-
ning information, India violations Articles 
12, 14, and 16 of the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW).
Incentive-based sterilization programs 
were popular with the Indian govern-
ment from the 1950s until the mid-1970s 
but disappeared after Indira Gandhi’s 
19-month emergency suspension of the 
Constitution ending in 1977. During this 
time, Prime Minister Gandhi’s son, Sanjay, 
implemented a policy of forcible steril-
ization in an attempt to curb the grow-
ing Indian population. When emergency 
law was lifted, Sanjay’s program stopped, 
and incentivized sterilization programs fell 
out of favor. However, in recent years, 
as India’s population reaches 1.2 billion, 
the federal government’s Family Welfare 
Program returned to the practice of incen-
tivizing sterilization among men and 
women in rural areas.
Unlike previous programs, the Rajasthan 
scheme was the first to outsource surger-
ies to private clinics. In an attempt to meet 
its goal of 30,000 sterilizations over a 
period of three months, the Fund offered 
private clinics about $308.00 per surgery 
and an additional $10.00 per case if a single 
clinic performed more than thirty opera-
tions a day. By offering such incentives to 
the private sector, the Indian government 
encourages clinics to “cut corners,” says 
Abhijit Das of Health Watch Uttar Pradesh. 
Utilizing the private sector also puts more 
pressure on women to undergo the oper-
ation because clinics have no monetary 
interest in obtaining informed consent, in 
providing women with alternative contra-
ceptive options, or in explaining the risks 
associated with the procedure. Das says 
sterilization is the number one contracep-
tive method offered in India and that one 
quarter of people in a recent survey did not 
even know about other options (37 percent 
of Indian women have been sterilized, three 
percent use the pill, and five percent use 
condoms). Additionally, under incentive-
based sterilization programs, women face 
an increased risk of medical complications 
because clinics do not provide the level of 
care necessary to ensure proper health, and 
women often decide to have children at a 
younger age and get sterilized between the 
ages of 22 and 23. At this age, women are 
more vulnerable to gynecological problems 
and are four times more likely to need a 
hysterectomy later in life.
CEDAW’s Article 12 requires that state 
parties eliminate health care discrimination 
against women. The article specifically 
provides for access to services, “including 
those related to family planning.” Article 
14 highlights the specific discrimination 
rural women face, requiring States to 
ensure that rural women have “access to 
adequate health care facilities, including 
information, counseling, and services in 
family planning.” Article 16 (1)(e) focuses 
on the disparity of power between spouses, 
requiring women to have equal rights to 
choose the number and spacing of children 
and to receive necessary information to 
make informed family planning choices.
Incentive-based programs violate wom-
en’s access to information and adequate 
health services by placing them in a posi-
tion in which they are not empowered 
to make informed family planning deci-
sions. As currently implemented, the Fund’s 
incentivized sterilization schemes greatly 
limit women’s legally protected choice and 
oppress, instead of promote, their equal 
rights and advancement. Private individu-
als, who profit from women’s lack of infor-
mation, are able to coerce women into get-
ting the surgery before they have considered 
other options. The provisions in Articles 
12, 14, and 16 require India, as a party 
to CEDAW, to take active steps to ensure 
women are provided equal access to health 
care services and adequate information, 
regardless of where they live or how much 
money they have. The first step toward 
meeting this international obligation is to 
provide comprehensive information about 
different forms of contraceptives available, 
the risks and benefits of each, and about 
women’s protected right to choose the size 
and spacing of their individual families.
Megan Wakefield, a J.D. candidate 
at the American University Washington 
College of Law, covers South and Central 
Asia for the Human Rights Brief.
east, sOutheast asia & Oceania
recent legal refOrMs in burMa 
give hOpe fOr lasting DeMOcratic 
change
Since President Thein Sein assumed 
power in March 2011, Burma’s nominally 
civilian government has instituted a num-
ber of legal reforms drawing the attention 
of the United Nations (UN) and many 
Western democracies. Observing mem-
bers of the international community are 
considering whether these changes are 
sufficiently genuine to warrant long-term 
engagement with the Burmese govern-
ment and the removal of sanctions against 
the country. As evidence of commitment 
to democratic advancement, they must 
weigh the significance of changes made 
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by executive and legislative decree over the 
past six months against nearly 50 years of 
authoritarian rule by military junta.
Burma’s most important legislative 
action in the past six months has been 
amending its Political Party Registration 
law. In October 2011, Parliament removed 
language that barred participation by par-
ties that had not run in previous elections, 
and by individuals with past convictions. 
The law now allows opposition leader 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to represent her 
National League for Democracy (NLD) in 
April 2012 parliamentary elections. The 
pro-democracy NLD is legally registered 
and Suu Kyi is seeking a parliamentary 
seat in the rural township of Kawhmu, 
southwest of Rangoon. Both will reengage 
in the political process despite Burma’s 
military junta having refused to hand power 
to NLD after its 1990 electoral victory. 
The winner of the 48 contested parliamen-
tary seats will nevertheless have limited 
influence among the 498 total elected seats 
in the upper and lower houses. The military 
controls one-quarter of the bicameral leg-
islature, and the President’s party occupies 
80% of the remaining seats.
Burma’s first parliament in over 
twenty-two years has passed additional 
legal reforms. Late 2011 saw the pas-
sage of a Labor Organization Law and 
Peaceful Assembly and Protection Bill. 
The former allows workers to organize 
unions and strike for the first time since 
1962. The Assembly bill legalizes peace-
ful demonstrations after applying for per-
mission from the government with five 
days notice. After fifty years of military 
rule before President Thein Sein, a retired 
military official himself, skeptics question 
the effects of these laws in practice. These 
cautious observers also point to reports 
of military abuse in Burma’s northern 
Kachin state, despite a recent ceasefire 
between the government and ethnic Karen 
rebels, as evidence of reform in name only. 
Furthermore, the government has yet to 
release as many as 900 political prisoners.
Perhaps the best example of the ten-
sion between the government’s persis-
tent authoritarian character in the face 
of burgeoning democratic advancements 
is Burma’s National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC). The NHRC was 
created in September 2011 by Government 
Notification No. 34/2011, which bypassed 
legislative approval. The body is comprised 
of fifteen members, including former mili-
tary officials, bureaucrats, and academ-
ics. Few details are available about its 
scope of responsibilities. According to an 
announcement by the Commission, it was 
founded to protect the rights of “citizens 
described in the constitution.” This man-
date may prove controversial, as Burma’s 
2008 Constitution denies citizenship to 
individuals whose parents are not Burmese 
nationals. The NHRC’s first actions have 
been to call for the release of all remaining 
political prisoners and to visit internally 
displaced persons in Kachin, though not 
to investigate allegations of human rights 
abuse by the military there.
A recent petition submitted to the NHRC 
will test both the Commission’s mandate 
and independence, key criteria under the 
Paris Principles’ minimum competency 
requirements for national human rights 
institutions. In November 2011, nearly 
thirty former doctors, lawyers, and students 
signed a letter requesting reinstatement of 
their access to education and practicing 
licenses. Due to their previous detention as 
political prisoners, lawyers such as Aung 
Thein, former legal counsel to Aung San 
Suu Kyi, have been banned from resuming 
practice. Though only protecting limited 
rights of citizens, the Burmese Constitution 
nevertheless guarantees equal opportunity 
to employment in provision 349, and a 
fundamental right to education in provision 
366. The petition is a potential bellwether 
to determine how the retired civil servants 
and scholars will approach allegations of 
rights violations through newly created, 
government-sanctioned channels.
On the 64th anniversary of its inde-
pendence, Burma can also celebrate the 
conclusion of a year that saw it win the 
2014 chairmanship of ASEAN, a visit 
from Secretary Hillary Clinton (the first 
by a US Secretary of State in fifty years), 
and commitments to discuss expansion of 
humanitarian and other foreign aid from 
the Japanese and British governments. 
While the legitimacy of reforms remains to 
be seen, Burma’s newest laws and NHRC 
at least create increased space for activists 
to take advantage of new rights and pro-
tect existing, fledgling rights. The NLD, 
Suu Kyi, and other activists have shown 
a willingness to continue to exploit even 
politically motivated change. Whether the 
President or military reneges on demo-
cratic progress, their political engagement 
and the international attention it draws will 
nevertheless impact the demand for human 
rights accountability in Burma.
liKe, cOMMent, share: rObust 
DOMestic anD internatiOnal Debate 
On thailanD’s lese MaJeste laws 
paving the way fOr refOrMs
In November 2011, the government 
of Thailand convicted a 61-year-old man 
for insulting the country’s monarchy in 
four text messages. Under Thailand’s lèse 
majesté law — one of the strictest in the 
world — Ampon Tangnoppakul was sen-
tenced to 20 years in prison, or five years 
for each text. Tangnoppakul’s sentence 
preceded two other highly publicized con-
victions in December. A Thai-US citizen 
was sentenced to 30 months for translating 
and posting online passages of a banned 
biography of the King. A Red Shirt politi-
cal activist was furthermore sentenced 
to 15 years for speeches made in 2008. 
Thailand has seen an increase from 33 
lèse majesté cases in 2005 to 478 by 2010. 
These three cases in particular have trig-
gered international expressions of concern 
and much domestic debate and activism 
in a struggle for the future of freedom of 
expression in Thailand in 2012.
The lèse majesté law is set forth in 
Article 112 of Thailand’s Criminal Code, 
which decrees that “whoever defames, 
insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the 
Heir to the throne or the Regent shall be pun-
ished with imprisonment of three to fifteen 
years.” Before 2006, Article 112 had been 
used most frequently by political elites as 
a proxy for targeting enemies with dissent-
ing political views. Any citizen can bring a 
lèse majesté complaint to police, and trials 
are often closed to the public. Thailand has 
been a party to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) since 
1996, Article 19 of which obligates the 
country to protect the rights of individuals 
who seek, receive, and impart information 
and ideas of all kinds. Nevertheless, support-
ers of Thailand’s constitutional monarchy 
deny the law’s harsh effect on freedom of 
expression. Instead, they cite the need to pro-
tect the monarchy as an institution to justify 
continued enforcement of Article 112.
Article 112 is often used in conjunction 
with the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) of 
2007 to block lèse majesté content. Under 
this law, 117 judicial orders have blocked 
75,000 Internet URL addresses in Thailand 
since 2007. The CCA’s vague language 
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targets Internet users, their online hosts, 
or other intermediaries related to posting 
data ostensibly threatening the “kingdom’s 
security.” The combined effect of the two 
laws is to expose a large number of Thais 
to what some observers, such as Human 
Rights Watch, criticize as politically moti-
vated prosecutions encouraged by royalist 
supporters. This hostile attitude toward 
online intermediaries has led Thai authori-
ties to warn Facebook users that sharing or 
liking certain messages could expose them 
to lèse majesté penalties. The Thai govern-
ment has additionally asked Facebook to 
remove 10,000 pages of what it perceives 
to be royal insults.
Thailand underwent its Universal 
Periodic Review in early October 2011, 
when 14 member states recommended 
amending or repealing Article 112. A few 
days later, UN Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression Frank la Rue issued 
a statement calling for amendments to 
both Article 112 and the CCA. According 
to the Special Rapporteur, the laws are 
overly broad and impose harsh crimi-
nal sanctions. Such international pressure 
was met domestically with a December 
“Fearlessness Walk,” where lèse majesté 
opponents stood silent for 112 minutes. 
Reactions in support of Article 112 were 
also seen in Bangkok in December, when 
protesting Thai royalists defended the law 
in front of the US embassy. In this way, 
international attention has contributed to 
vigorous debate of lèse majesté within 
Thailand.
Despite criticism, the government’s 
pursuit of convictions under Article 112 
show a continuing resolve to politicize 
Thailand’s monarchy. While Thailand’s 
Facebook users contemplate the latest 
lèse majesté convictions, Deputy Prime 
Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung recently 
announced plans to spend $12.6m in tech-
nology to block online content critical of 
the monarchy. In an effort to diffuse ten-
sions, Thailand’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission has announced its support 
of reforms to Article 112. These changes 
would give lighter sentences for convic-
tions and better legal oversight of claims. 
The announcement was publicized at the 
same time that the National Human Rights 
Commission formed a task force to review 
the legality of lèse majesté enforcement. 
The results of the Commission’s report 
will be available in June 2012. Until then, 
international pressure, domestic debate, 
and investigations by impartial govern-
ment institutions will continue to act as an 
engine for change.
Thais-Lyn Trayer, a J.D. candidate at the 
American University Washington College 
of Law, covers East, Southeast Asia & 
Oceania for the Human Rights Brief.
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